Aims: The paper estimates the impact of a supported employment programme implemented in Hungary. Methods: This is a non-experimental evaluation using a matching identification strategy supported by rich data on individual characteristics, personal employment and unemployment history and the local labour market situation. We use a time-window approach to ensure that programme participants and matched controls entered unemployment at the same point in time, and thus faced very similar labour market conditions. Results: We find that the programme had a positive effect of 16 percentage points on the probability of finding a job among men and 25 percentage points among women. The alternative outcome indicator of not re-entering the unemployment registry shows somewhat smaller effects in the case of women. Conclusions: In comparison to similarly costly programmes that do not facilitate employment in the primary labour market, rehabilitation services represent a viable alternative.
Introduction
The incidence of disability among the working-age population is high and tends to be rising in most developed countries. In several Member States of the European Union, the number of people who suffer from a disability that constrains their ability to work exceeds the number of unemployed [1] . People with disabilities typically face more difficulty in finding employment and are consequently more likely to become long-term unemployed or to withdraw from the labour market. While most of them have retained some capacity to work, they typically need additional support and coordinated provision of employment, health and welfare services in order to be able to return to employment [2] .
Policies promoting the labour market inclusion of disabled jobseekers may tackle the demand side (e.g. anti-discrimination legislation or wage subsidies) or the supply side (e.g. vocational rehabilitation or supported employment). While most developed countries apply a range of policies to promote the labour market integration of disabled jobseekers, the existing evidence on the effectiveness of particular forms of intervention is scarce, especially for European countries [1] [2] [3] .
This paper estimates the impact of a supported employment programme implemented in Hungary. The contribution of the paper may be twofold: first, it helps build a body of evidence on the effectiveness of employment rehabilitation measures implemented in Europe and, second, it investigates whether such measures may have any impact when the context is unfavourable. Employment rehabilitation measures that aim to place disabled jobseekers in the regular labour market are likely to be more successful in a context where: (a) employers (and fellow workers) are not strongly prejudiced against people with disabilities; and (b) public employment services (or the external providers subcontracted by them) have the necessary expertise to implement a high-quality rehabilitation service. Hungary is much weaker on both these conditions than the Nordic countries or the UK where similar measures have already been implemented with some success [3] [4] [5] [6] . Moreover, in Hungary people with disabilities have typically worked in segregated sheltered workshops [7] , implying that most employers in the open labour market are unused to hiring them. The results of the paper may be relevant not only for Eastern Europe but for Southern Europe as well, where the conditions are to some extent comparable to the Hungarian case.
earlier evidence
Until recently, rehabilitation services for unemployed jobseekers were not part of mainstream labour market measures, which explains why most of the evidence comes from small-scale or pilot projects. There is also considerable variation in the design of rehabilitation services: more traditional programmes may focus mainly on vocational retraining [8] or wage subsidies [4, 9] , while later innovations may provide a combination of various measures tailored to the needs of the individual client. Rehabilitation programmes were introduced relatively early and have been evaluated more thoroughly in the US [10] [11] [12] . While there are a number of studies on the labour supply effects of financial incentives in sickness or disability benefits [13] [14] [15] , the evidence on rehabilitation measures is relatively scarce for Europe [2] .
In Europe, the most influential study is based on an experiment of a specific rehabilitation method, the so-called Individual Placement and Support (IPS) model, which was developed in the US for jobseekers with a mental condition. 1 In Europe, the effectiveness of the method was tested in the EQOLISE project, 2 on a sample of 312 individuals with severe mental illness who were randomly assigned to receive either IPS or standard vocational services. The sample was drawn from six European cities. Burns et al. report that IPS was more effective than vocational services for every vocational outcome: 55% of the participants worked for at least one day during the 18-month follow-up period compared to 43% of those assigned to vocational rehabilitation services [2, 16] . The report also found that the context was important: the local unemployment rates explained a sizeable proportion of the observed variation in IPS effectiveness (participants performing better in low-unemployment regions).
A handful of single country studies also found some positive effects on re-employment. Bewley et al. evaluated the Pathways to Work programme of the UK, which offered an individualised package of rehabilitation services and training for disabled jobseekers [17] . They compared outcomes in the pilot districts to non-participating districts using a difference-in-differences approach. According to their estimates, 18 months after the initial benefit inquiry, the control group's probability of being employed was about 29.7%, while in the treatment group it was 37.1%. Importantly, the effect was driven by participants no longer receiving incapacity benefit; that is, those with milder forms of disability. Orr et al (2007) estimated the long-term (24 months after completing the programme) impact of the same programme using a matched control group and found an 11 percentage points higher employment rate for participants [6] . However, the evaluation did not fully eliminate potential selection bias arising from the voluntary nature of the programme.
Aakvik et al. evaluated a Norwegian vocational rehabilitation programme, which pays income support and provides training to those unable to return to work after 52 weeks on sick leave [18] . They present maximum likelihood estimates of a factor model of selection and programme participation and compare the results to estimates using matching and linear instrumental variables. The authors report a positive but weakly significant effect for female participants, and show that this result is likely to be driven mainly by the selection of participants by programme administrators.
Rehwald et al evaluated a Danish policy experiment on intensifying rehabilitation support and activation during sick leave [3] . The programme lasted 18 weeks and included weekly caseworker meetings and rehabilitation activities, which could take one of three forms: (a) traditional measures (e.g. vocational counselling, skills development, on-the-job training or internships); (b) paramedical care and counselling; and (c) return to work with a gradual increase of working hours. The caseworker chose the combination of the measures best suited to the client's needs. The control group did not have access to paramedical care and only had monthly meetings. The evaluation found that intensified gradual return-towork significantly improved labour market outcomes, 3 while the other two options reduced subsequent performance. 
The institutional context
The take-up of disability benefits sharply increased in Hungary in the early 1990s, and the stock of recipients continued to increase in the following two decades, as review rules were lenient and rehabilitation services were weak, while benefit amounts were relatively generous [5] . The rise in benefit claims was mainly due to the 1989-1991 regime change, which induced a sharp decline and a structural shift in labour demand, and a subsequent rise in long-term unemployment, affecting low-skilled workers in particular [19] . Incapacity benefits thus became an institutionalised way for older and low-skilled workers to withdraw from the labour market. 4 A special module of the Labour Force Survey of 2008 reports that working-age persons with a disability had an employment rate of 23% and an unemployment rate of 18% (compared to 62% and 7% in the non-disabled population). They were older and less educated (75% had only primary or lower secondary education) than their non-disabled peers. The most common causes of disability are related to blood circulation and spinal problems that are likely to constrain performance in physical work.
Until about 2006, Hungarian disability policy was dominated by permanent welfare benefits and segregated sheltered workshops. Though access to benefits was somewhat tightened (mainly by increasing the stringency of the claim procedure), this only affected the inflow, as reviews remained infrequent and rarely led to a termination of the benefit. Though employers were obliged to offer rehabilitation and workplace alteration to employees who have lost some of their work capacity on the job, this was not enforced. Most disabled workers were employed in sheltered workshops while the public provision of rehabilitation services supporting reemployment in the open labour market was poor and uneven across the country [20] .
The introduction of the rehabilitation programme in 2008 was part of a broader policy initiative to activate disabled persons that was launched in late 2006. The aim was to refocus the welfare system and increase incentives for integrated employment both on the supply and the demand side. The first step was to refine the claim evaluation process and curb the subsidies for sheltered employment in 2007. In the second step, the Temporary Rehabilitation Allowance (TRA) was introduced in 2008, in order to curb access to permanent disability pensions. At the same time, the Regular Social Allowance (RSA) and other disability benefits were made conditional on cooperation with the public employment service. However, local job centres were entrusted with this new task without a proportional increase in their staff. As a result, the client/staff ratio almost doubled 5 (from 118 to 191) from 2007 and 2009, and deteriorated further as unemployment started to rise during the global financial crisis.
The target group
The programme was available to all claimants of the TRA ('rehabilitációs járadék'). This allowance was introduced in January 2008 (i.e. around the time when the programme started). This implied that the eligible group roughly corresponded to new entrants to the allowance scheme (but in most cases the entry was preceded by a period of unemployment). The allowance was granted to those who lost at least 50% of work capacity but had a high chance of successful employment rehabilitation as evaluated by a committee of health and employment experts. In most cases this implied that the health condition of the client had already stabilised.
As of February 2010, the target group was extended to disabled jobseekers with at least 40% of work capacity lost, regardless of benefit status. The extension covered two main subgroups: (a) recipients of the RSA, who had a 40-49% loss of work capacity and who were obliged to cooperate with the job centre; and (b) other disabled persons who voluntarily chose to cooperate with the job centre.
Most programme participants in our sample (those entering between March 2008 and December 2010) were on the TRA (59%) or the RSA (14%). 6 A minority were on other disability benefits (7%), or did not have any welfare benefit (7%). Information on benefit receipt was missing for 13% of the sample, but most of them were probably TRA recipients as, according to the official statistics, about 70% of the programme participants were on TRA.
The behavioural conditions of disability benefits
The recipients of the TRA were obliged to visit the local job centre, sign a cooperation agreement and continue cooperating with the job centre for three years (or until their condition changed or they got re-employed). This entailed the acceptance of suitable offers of a training opportunity or a job and regular visits to the job centre, as prescribed by the rehabilitation plan (which was annexed to the cooperation agreement). This cooperation was a condition of receiving the allowance. Concerning the health status, there was no obligatory check-up during the three years, and eligibility was maximised in three years. The frequency and form of contact with the job centre was determined by mutual agreement between the counsellor and the client and outlined in the cooperation agreement. The minimum requirement was to meet twice a year for a review of the rehabilitation plan.
The RSA and other disability benefits were also conditional on cooperation with the job centre, which entailed signing a cooperation agreement, regular visits and accepting suitable offers. However, this rule was introduced only as of January 2008 and job centres had very limited capacity (or motivation) to enforce it.
Participation in the personalised SROP1.1.1 programme was regarded as an additional option on top of regular services and not enforced as a condition of the allowance, which implies that the threat effect was probably small. According to official reports on the programme, during the five years of its implementation, job centres informed 24,000 of their disabled clients about the programme and of that, almost 15,000 (or 62%) signed a rehabilitation plan. The dropout rate was low: about 84% completed their rehabilitation plan. There is anecdotal evidence that terminations of the TRA due to non-cooperation were very rare.
There is some qualitative evidence from job centres stating that, initially, all TRA recipients were informed of the programme (i.e. the job centre did not 'cream-skim' them), but starting from 2010, job centres were encouraged to select clients with more potential for re-employment. This was probably in response to the pressure to achieve performance targets, which was higher than in other, nationally funded programmes.
Financial incentives for re-employment
The net amount of the TRA was about the same as the disability pension for the same number of service years (i.e. it was wage related and relatively generous). The RSA was flat rate, equalling around a third of the minimum wage.
When re-employed, TRA recipients could retain 100% of the TRA for three months and 50% for another three months if the new wage exceeded 90% of the prior income (for three consecutive months). If the new wage was below that, the TRA would only expire as usual, at the end of the three-year eligibility period. If the TRA recipient was caught on unregistered employment, the TRA would be suspended for three months; if caught a second time, the TRA would be terminated.
RSA recipients could retain their benefit as long as their average labour income did not exceed 80% of the minimum wage over a period of six months. This implies that in most cases they lost the benefit six months after re-employment.
As we show in the next section, the control group was likely to include a higher share of RSA recipients and, for them, the expected gains from employment were higher. This is not only because TRA recipients would lose half of the benefit after the first three months while RSA recipients could keep it for six months, but also due to benefit levels. The flat rate RSA was around 30% of the minimum wage, while the TRA was 51-63% of the prior wage (depending on age and service years) and amounted to around 100% of the minimum wage for the large majority of recipients. We therefore argue that the estimated effects can be attributed mainly to the services and measures provided by the job centre, rather than to the financial incentives attached to disability benefits.
The elements of the programme
The rehabilitation plan was based on the needs assessment and recommendations of the expert committee that evaluated the client's claim for the rehabilitation allowance. The committee also included medical and employment experts, and they prescribed both medical and employment rehabilitation services in their recommendations. The plan prescribed what services the client should get, and when they should get them. Job centre counsellors were charged with coordinating the client's access to the recommended measures and services. Some of the services were provided in-house, others were subcontracted to local non-governmental organisations or training providers.
The programme was financed by the European Social Fund, thus the available range of services and measures was wider than the regular offer of the job centre, and the programme also prescribed that participants should take up at least one programme element. Apart from vocational education, job-search counselling, support for start-ups and the reimbursement of commuting and other related costs of working, the programme also offered short training courses (e.g. in job-search skills), reimbursement of care costs of a dependent family member, a personal mentor, personal assistance as well as workplace adaptation for new hires, job trial and wage subsidies (100% of wage costs for 90 days or 365 days) to the employer.
The administrative costs of obtaining the wage subsidy were considerable but there was no obligation of extending the employment contract beyond the subsidised period. Clients could also be referred to social and medical services meeting a basic rehabilitation need. The actual combination of these measures was decided by the counsellor. On average, participants used three or four measures or services. The most frequently used elements included short courses (of maximum 30 days), personal mentoring and wage subsidies. About 50% of participants used mentoring and counselling combined with a wage subsidy and/or training, and 26% used counselling, a wage subsidy and/or training. Job centres also actively approached employers and organised specialised job fairs in order to promote the programme and, generally, the advantages of employing disabled jobseekers.
Data
We use three data sources: the Public Employment Service (PES) Administrative Records of Programme Participants (ARPP) and the Unemployment Registry (UER) that are both maintained by the Hungarian PES (National Labour Office, NLO) and the Standardized Hungarian Labour Dataset (SHLD). 7 The three datasets were linked together by the NLO, based on anonymous identification codes generated from health insurance registration numbers. 8 The data cover the unemployment history of all participants entering the programme before 31 December 2010 and of non-participating registered jobseekers in the corresponding period.
In particular, the ARPP includes detailed information about the treated group; that is, individuals who entered the SROP 1.1.1 programme before 31 December 2010. The database records personal characteristics (gender, date of birth, education, disability, degree of work capacity loss) and programmespecific information (date of entry and exit to/from the programme, services and benefits received). The data cover 10,684 individuals who did not participate in any other programme but the SROP 1.1.1.
The UER sample includes information about some of the programme participants (6167 out of 10,684 individuals), and also about the pool of potential control individuals. It covers all jobseekers who were registered unemployed for at least one day between 1 January 2004 and 31 December 2011. The following information is included in the UER: entry and exit date of unemployment; the reason for exit or suspension (new job, public works, retirement, etc.); benefits received and their duration; a dummy variable on disability status; and personal characteristics (gender, date of birth, place of residence, level of education). The UER has no information on the degree of work capacity loss.
We added a few contextual variables to the individual level database, such as settlement type (village, town, regional centre, capital), region and micro-regional unemployment for the population aged 15-50 [21] .
Identification strategy and estimation methods
As explained above, assignment to the programme was not random. Participants were likely to be selected both through the selection process of the unemployment offices and through self-selection. Due to this endogeneity, we cannot simply compare the labour market outcomes of participants and nonparticipating jobseekers. We aim at estimating the causal effect of the programme on the participants, the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated in a conditional independence framework, by assuming that conditional on our rich data, assignment is as good as if it was random.
We estimate the impact of the programme on uneducated participants; that is, on those having, at most, a primary school degree. This may help to reduce unobserved heterogeneity in our sample. 9 Further, we restrict the sample to those who did not participate in any other programme during this period. This leaves us with 1688 participants (1103 women and 585 men) out of the 6167 participants covered by the ARPP and the UER. Table I compares the descriptive statistics of these men and women to the population of the rest of all SROP 1.1.1 participants. Our subsample is less educated, slightly older and more likely to have an unemployment history but less likely to be long-term unemployed when entering the programme than the rest of participants with a higher educational attainment.
An ideal control group would consist of jobseekers that were entitled to one of the allowances but did not participate in the programme. However, the construction of such a control group was not possible because we have no information on disability benefit entitlements for non-participants. However, the UER does contain a dummy indicator for disability status, and we used this to identify the pool of potential participants. Using a dataset that links the registry with insurance records we verified that the registry contains a large pool of RSA recipients but very few jobseekers with more severe conditions. Thus, we assume that most jobseekers with a disability status in the UER were eligible to participate in the programme. Admittedly, the disability indicator might also cover jobseekers with a lower degree of health impairment that does not qualify them for the RSA. This is a small concern as it would induce a downward bias in our estimates, assuming that a smaller loss of work capacity (ceteris paribus) implies better chances on the labour market. Figure 1 summarises the structure of the matched sample of treated and control observations vis-a-vis the pool of all programme participants and eligible, registered and non-registered jobseekers. The matched sample (dashed rectangle in Figure 1 ) only includes persons who had been registered at some point prior to claiming TRA (grey area). The treatment group includes SROP participants, and the control group includes disabled non-participants.
Note that the job centre collected the same information on recipients of the TRA as on the regular unemployed clients. However, the former group was not called registered jobseeker and was excluded from all official statistics on registered unemployment (i.e. the UER data we use). The records of programme participants were also kept separately from the UER.
By design, the control group could not include any TRA recipients (as they were not required to register at the job centre), implying that, on average, as we mentioned earlier, they would have a somewhat better health status and stronger financial incentives for re-employment.
To construct a comparison group, we narrowed the pool of non-participant jobseekers in the UER to those who, based on their disability status, would have been eligible to participate in the programme but did not participate. Then, we selected the subsample of eligible non-participants that: (a) did not participate in any active labour market programme (ALMP); (b) are uneducated (i.e. completed eight years of primary school or less); and (c) were unemployed in the period of the programme. This subsample consists of 74,826 potential control observations. Table II compares the observable characteristics of uneducated programme participants and potential control observations. As it is shown, programme participants are more likely to have completed elementary school, more likely to have employment experience, had fewer unemployment spells in the past and were more likely to live in a settlement where the unemployment rate is lower.
Under the condition of unconfoundedness (which is explicitly assumed in our estimations), the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator could be used for estimating the average treatment effects by including a binary variable indicating treatment in the regression. We use matching instead because, as Imbens points out, OLS assumes strong functional form restrictions, and can be sensitive to minor changes in the specification of the regression if the covariate distributions differ substantially by treatment status [22] . Particularly in our case, the number of potential controls before the matching is much larger than the number of treated units, and they differ considerably in terms of covariates (see Table I ). Therefore, the use of OLS (which relies on the linearity assumption) without adjusting the balance with matching might be inadequate due to the extrapolation between treatment groups. To lessen the selection bias, we set up a two-step procedure. In the first step, we estimate a propensity score, and in the second step, we directly match 1:1 treated and control observations based on the propensity score estimated in the first step and the date of becoming a registered jobseeker. Some of the programme participants in our estimation sample were already registered unemployed on the day when they entered the programme (609), and some were neither registered unemployed nor employed (1079); we assumed that people in this latter group were non-registered unemployed. Our procedure differs for these two types of participants. As the non-observable characteristics (motivation, etc.) of registered and non-registered unemployed programme participants may be inherently different, we estimated the propensity score in four subgroups: separately for registered versus non-registered unemployed participants, and within these two categories, separately for men and women. Furthermore, in the second step, as it will be detailed in the following, we chose control observations for registered unemployed participants based on the date when they entered the UER, while for non-registered unemployed participants we chose control observations based on the day when they entered the programme.
Going into further detail, in the first step, we estimated a propensity score model on the aforementioned subsample of participants and eligible non-participants following the interval-matching algorithm written by Becker and Ichino [23] . We estimated the following probit model:
where T i is a treatment indicator, showing whether individual i participated in the programme or not; and X is a matrix capturing the following individual and regional characteristics: number of entries into the UER before the first day of the programme for non-registered unemployed participants or that of the current registered unemployment spell for registered unemployed participants and controls; whether the individual had ever been employed before the programme period within the observation period; number of days spent in unemployment before the first day of the programme or the current unemployment spell as detailed above; long-term unemployed indicator (= 1 if unemployment spell > 365 days); age at the first day of the last unemployment spell; local unemployment rate; convergence region indicator (= 1 if regional GDP/capita < 75% of EU25 average); settlement type indicators.
To estimate the propensity score, we started the interval-matching algorithm based on Becker and Ichino [23] from a linear X'β specification, and respecified the propensity score model with interaction and higher-order terms accordingly to find a specification that yields a strata-balanced propensity score distribution. The accepted model ensures covariate balance in all intervals of the propensity score on the common support in which the average estimated propensity scores of participants and eligible non-participants do not differ. In other words, the method estimates a propensity score and splits the distribution of estimated propensity scores to intervals such that within each interval the average estimated propensity scores of the treated and control observations are statistically equal. Then, it checks whether within these intervals the average of the individual characteristics of the treated and control observations are significantly different or not. If not, the estimation is done. If at least one individual characteristic is different in at least one stratum, the propensity score is to be re-estimated in different specifications as many times as needed to find a balanced specification. The estimated coefficients in the final propensity score model specifications are presented in Table III . When estimating the effect of an ALMP on employment outcomes, it is important to compare groups facing the exact same local labour market conditions. Thus, we want to make sure that our controls became unemployed around the same time as programme participants. Therefore, as a second step, we looked at all programme participants one-by-one, and marked the day when they entered either (a) the UER if they were already registered unemployed on the day when they entered the programme; or (b) when they entered the programme if they were nonregistered unemployed and, thus, we had no information about when they become unemployed. We opened a +/-30-day time-window around this day, and collected all eligible non-participants that entered registered unemployment in this period. Choosing a +/-30-day window ensures that the treated and the control group became unemployed in the same time period, but it is not too narrow to make the choice of control observations too difficult.
From this group, we chose exactly one control individual to each treated observation such that (a) the control individual was still unemployed when the treated individual entered the programme, and (b) among all the potential controls in this neighbourhood, we minimised the distance in their estimated propensity scores. Each potential control observation was matched at most once, so we selected the control sample without replacement. 10 If we could not find an appropriate control individual for a The propensity score models are specified based on the interval-matching algorithm of Becker and Ichino (2002) [23] . All specifications ensure covariate balance in all intervals of the propensity score on the common support in which the average estimated propensity scores of participants and eligible non-participants do not differ. Probit model coefficients (not marginal effects) are reported. Standard errors are in parenthesis. GDP: gross domestic product. *p < 0.001.
participant with the aforementioned procedure, we excluded that participant from the estimation sample. By using this method, we found a control individual to 515 out of 585 men and 973 out of 1103 women participants; that is, 200 participants were left out because of having no suitable control individual. The covariate balance of our final sample is shown in Table IV , which compares the mean pre-programme characteristics (referring to year 2008) of treated and control individuals after the matching procedure. Even after the matching procedure, significant differences were found between the treated and the control group in the percentage of the very low educated (those with less than eight years of primary school) and in the percentage of the long-term unemployed (those with an unemployment spell longer that 365 days). Among men, individuals in the treated group are less likely to be very low-educated and long-term unemployed than individuals in the control group. Women in the treated group are also less likely to be very low educated, however, as opposed to men, more likely to be long-term unemployed, than women in the control group. Among men, those in the control group tend to live in regions with a significantly higher unemployment rate, and similarly to women, they are more likely to be longterm unemployed compared with those in the treated group, even after matching. Concerning the other covariates, no significant differences were found. As shown in Table II , the matching procedure decreased the magnitude of selection with respect to the probability of past employment and the number of unemployment spells, but did not eradicate differences in education or in the probability of long-term unemployment. In order to make sure that these differences do not bias our estimated treatment effects, we explicitly control for these characteristics in our estimated models as a robustness check, and estimate the effect of the programme separately on the longterm unemployed.
As we indicated, we found control individuals to 515 out of 585 men and to 973 out of 1103 women uneducated programme participants. and less likely to be long-term unemployed than those left without control observations. Similarly, Table VI compares the matched control observations to the sample of all potential controls. Matched controls are more likely to have ever worked before the programme period and less likely to have unemployment history than the rest of the universe of uneducated, disabled jobseekers. Our identification strategy assumes that conditional on observed characteristics, assignment into the programme is random. We believe that unobservable factors that may drive both programme participation and employment outcomes are either part of one's personality or health status, or they are related to the actual condition of the labour market. Regarding the former, we assume that these potential personality traits are captured by our rich data on employment and unemployment history. Caliendo et al. examine how biased unconfoundedness-based treatment estimators are due to selection on usually unobserved characteristics such as personality traits, attitudes, expectations and jobsearch behaviour, exploiting a unique dataset [24] . They show that although these variables have a significant role in explaining selection into treatment and labour outcomes, once detailed employment and unemployment history is controlled for, including or omitting such variables do not impact significantly the estimated treatment effect. Thus, they conclude that sufficiently rich administrative data, as in our case, may be good enough to examine the effectiveness of ALMPs in the absence of randomised control trials.
Unobservable factors related to labour market conditions are taken care of when we control for the local unemployment rate in the propensity score and when we make sure that each treated and matched control observation pair entered unemployment within the same narrow time window.
As the programme entry date and the duration of participation is different for each individual, the observation period is also individual-specific. However, this is not a problem because we follow the participants and their control pairs for exactly the same time period. These periods start at the beginning of 2008 and end before or during the second half of 2012. The duration of programme participation ranged between 36 days and three years.
results

General results
We evaluate the effect of the programme on two outcome variables: (a) on the probability of finding employment, and (b) on the probability of exiting and not (re-) entering unemployment. Our employment outcome variable is constructed using employment spells recorded in the SHLD database. It is a binary variable: it takes the value 1 if the observed person enters employment and stays in employment for at least 30 days either during the programme or within six months afterwards; and 0 otherwise.
The unemployment outcome is based on the UER. In the case of control individuals and programme participants not receiving the TRA, it takes the value 1 if the observed person exits from the unemployment spell that he/she started before entering the programme and did not re-enter unemployment during the programme or within six months afterwards; and 0 otherwise. In the case of programme participants receiving TRA, it takes the value 1 if the observed person enters unemployment within six months after exiting the programme; and 0 otherwise.
Our results are presented in Tables VII and VIII , separately for men and women. In order to obtain a more detailed picture of the programme effect and of participants that did not receive a wage subsidy during the programme and their matched control individuals. Employment refers to whether the observed person entered employment and stayed in employment for at least 30 days either during the programme or within six months afterwards. Not re-entering unemployment refers to not spending more than 30 days in unemployment status in a forthcoming unemployment spell following the spell in which one entered the programme. Employment history refers to whether having worked ever before the programme period.
Unemployment history refers to the number of days spent in unemployment before the first day of the last unemployment spell, and the number of entries into the unemployment registry before the first day of the last unemployment spell. Impact as a % of control group SD refers to the estimated effect measured as a % of the SD of the outcome variable in the control group. of participants that did not receive a wage subsidy during the programme and their matched control individuals. Employment refers to whether the observed person entered employment and stayed in employment for at least 30 days either during the programme or within six months afterwards. Not re-entering unemployment refers to not spending more than 30 days in unemployment status in a forthcoming unemployment spell following the spell in which one entered the programme. Employment history refers to whether having worked ever before the programme period.
Unemployment history refers to the number of days spent in unemployment before the first day of the last unemployment spell, and the number of entries into the unemployment registry before the first day of the last unemployment spell. Impact as a % of control group SD refers to the estimated effect measured as a % of the SD of the outcome variable in the control group.
control for any potentially remaining selection between the treated and the control, we show the results separately for the long-term unemployed participants and their matched pairs (C), and for those who did not receive a wage subsidy as part of the programme and their pairs (D). The programme had a positive impact on the probability of entering employment. It increased the probability of finding a job by 25 percentage points for women and by 16 percentage points for men. Controlling for individual and other characteristics does not change the magnitude of the estimated effect. The employment effects of the programme are somewhat lower among long-term unemployed participants (14 and 7 percentage points for women and men, respectively).
The effects on the probability of re-entering the UER are larger for men (25 percentage points) than for women (5 percentage points). The effects on the probability of recurrent unemployment is quite stable across long-term unemployed participants as well. When hired, programme participants were potentially eligible to a wage subsidy paid to their employer, though this was not automatically granted. As this was a particularly costly element of the programme, we replicated the estimates on the subsample of those who did not receive a wage subsidy. Among men, we found no effect for those who did not receive a wage subsidy, while among women, we found a 10-percentage-point impact.
Finding employment versus not re-entering the UER
As we have shown in the previous subsection, among women, the effect of the programme is larger on the probability of finding a job than on the probability of not re-entering the UER. This difference may come from three sources.
1. Some of those finding a job lose it quite quickly and re-enter the UER. 2. Some of those not finding a job recorded in administrative data may not re-enter the UER because they either choose to move into inactivity. 3. Some of those not finding a job recorded in administrative data may not re-enter the UER because they work in the shadow economy.
If there are potential unobservable characteristics that drive both programme participation and employment outcomes, they should also be correlated with the probability of working in the shadow economy, because engagement in unregistered work may be the reason for not participating in the programme. Furthermore, those working unofficially are more likely to have shorter employment spells because they may switch back-and-forth between official and unofficial jobs. Thus, we believe that due to this phenomenon, the effect on the probability of employment is upward biased, because the controls are more likely to work in the shadow economy and, thus, less likely to work officially and recorded in the administrative data. On the other hand, effects on the probability of not re-entering the UER are probably underestimated because those working in the shadow economy have less incentive to get registered even though they do not have an official job. In other words, among the controls we should see more people coming back to the registry, because we know from the SHLD that they are not employed. Thus, the two estimations work as upper and lower bounds of the real effects.
Effects by subsidy type
Tables IX and X show the effect of the programme estimated separately for those who received Temporary Rehabilitation Allowance (TRA) and RSA when entering the programme, and for those who belonged to neither of these two groups. Both for men and women, the employment effects of the programme are highest in the group of RSA recipients (42 and 44 percentage points). For men we find no impact for those receiving TRA, while for women, we find a relatively small effect of 8 percentage points. On the probability of re-entering the UER, on the other hand, the effects are the largest among TRA recipients -32 percentage points among men and 25 percentage points among women. For RSA recipient women, the programme increased the probability of entering the UER again.
Discussion
Interpreting the results
The paper aims at estimating the joint impact of a rehabilitation allowance and an individualised combination of rehabilitation services on uneducated participants (with eight years of primary school or less) by comparing employment outcomes for programme participants and a matched control group. Participants had a higher chance of 16-25 percentage points to be re-employed than the control group, and for women, we find positive effects even without having a wage subsidy. Furthermore, the programme lowered the probability of recurrent unemployment by around 6-21 percentage points, even without a wage subsidy. The programme had a significant positive effect on the long-term unemployed as well.
Our identification strategy is based on unconfoundedness: we assumed that controlling for a large set of control variables, including employment and unemployment history and local labour market information, assignment to the programme was as good as if it was random. In the case of any non-experimental evaluation, however, one must be very cautious about her conclusions. Although we do control for a rich set of characteristics, we can never be sure whether unobserved characteristics are driving the estimated effects, especially because we find a larger impact than the literature. In our case, we suspect that both cream-skimming and self-selection might have occurred. In fact, the comparison of the control and treatment group shows that programme participants had a slight advantage in terms of schooling, and they were less likely to be long-term unemployed as well (see Table IV ). On the other hand, control individuals probably suffered from a lower degree of work capacity loss than the participants of the programme, which might cause a downward bias in our estimated effects.
A number of other factors may have induced an upward bias into the estimates, or might help explain the magnitude of the effects. First, the large and significant positive effects on the probability of finding a job are likely to include an upward bias due to the fact that we have no data on undeclared work, and this may affect the treatment and control groups differently. It seems likely that those participating in the programme (especially those benefitting from a wage subsidy) are less likely to be re-employed in the shadow economy than the control group who had no access to rehabilitation subsidy or to the services of the programme. This imposes a downward bias in the employment outcomes of the control group recorded in our database.
Second, we could not account for substitution effects, nor deadweight loss.
Lastly, the literature generally examines programmes in which even the controls receive some basic services; thus, they measure the marginal effect of having additional versus basic services. In our case, it is likely that the baseline of regular services provided by the job centre was limited to administering the registration, as job centres faced high and increasing caseloads during the programme period and had no incentives to pay particular attention to disabled jobseekers.
Implications
The demonstrated positive impact of personalised rehabilitation services combined with a rehabilitation allowance confirm that such programmes may be effectively implemented in an unfavourable environment where employers tend to discriminate disabled jobseekers and the general quality of employment services is not high. The employment effects are smaller, but positive for long-term unemployed participants as well. This implies that, at least in comparison to similarly costly programmes (such as permanent disability benefits for non-employed individuals or sheltered workshops) that do not facilitate employment in the primary labour market, rehabilitation services represent a viable alternative. The finding that employment effects are positive for those who did not receive a wage subsidy suggests that for some jobseekers, the programme costs can be kept relatively low. This implies that further analyses of the targeting of the programme (using more detailed information on the characteristics of the participants) may help policymakers in refining the procedures of choosing the mix of programme elements provided to participants and, based on that, identifying a better allocation that reduces the average cost of the programme. This would not only improve cost-benefit outcomes but would also allow the employment services to take on a larger number of participants.
Further research is necessary for assessing the cost-effectiveness of these programmes, which would require a more detailed account of implementation costs than is currently available in the official documentation of the programme. Estimates on the employment effects over a longer time span, such as two or five years after completing the programme, and on the impact on wages would allow us to further refine the cost-benefit analysis of the programme. useful comments on earlier versions of this paper.
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